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CHAPTER 2 
Landlord and Tenant 
EDWARD L. SCHWARTZ 
A. DECISIONS 
§2.1. Option to renew: Implied covenant in sublease. In Hook 
Brown Co. v. Farnsworth Press, Inc.,1 a sublessee was held entitled 
to specific performance of an oral agreement to sublease a portion of a 
Hoor. After holding that a very sketchy letter signed by the lessor2 
satisfied the statute of frauds, the Supreme Judicial Court then ruled 
that the words "we will lease to you for one year renewable" should 
be interpreted in the light of the oral conversationS and so construed 
meant that the sublessee could, at its option, lease for successive one-
year periods, but in no event longer than the date of expiration of the 
major lease because any other construction would be unreasonable.4 
The Court permitted resort to parol evidence because the letter was 
not a formal, integrated document but merely a memorandum of the 
oral agreement.5 If the letter had been "integrated," the Court would 
have been bound by prior decisions to construe the words "one year 
renewable" to mean a sublease for one year with an option to renew 
for a like period on the same terms and conditions except that no 
further option would be imported.6 
The Court also stated: 
EDWARD L. SCHWARTZ is a member of the Massachusetts Bar and practices in 
Boston. He is author of Lease Drafting in Massachusetts (1961). 
§2.1. 11965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 27, 208 N.E.2d 681. 
2 "In accordance with our conversation, November 20, 1961, we will lease to you 
space on the ninth floor as discussed ... on Monday, November 21, 1961. We will 
lease to you for one year renewable ..• at the rate of 60¢ per square ft. per annum." 
A plan of the space to be subleased was delivered to the sublessor in the course of 
negotiations, the Court stating that it was incorporated by reference into the 
letter memorandum. 
S The oral understanding was that the sublessee was to have "one year renewable" 
by which the sublessor meant "as long as you want." 
4 If the sublessee knew the date of expiration of the major lease, then it must be 
taken by implication that his sublessor could and would only sublease until the ex-
piration date of the overlease. 
5 The Court in effect states that it is a question for the trial court whether the 
letter was intended to be the lease itself or merely a memorandum of the oral under-
standing. The trial judge "concluded" that it was merely a memorandum. As such, 
the Court found that it complied with the statute of frauds. 
6 See Schwartz, Lease Drafting in Massachusetts §5.28 n.l (1961), hereinafter cited 
as Schwartz. 
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§2.1 LANDLORD AND TENANT 13 
As Hook must have taken its sublease with knowledge that Farns-
worth would have a principal lease of the type usually granted by 
[the major lessor], the sublease should have required Hook so to 
conduct itself as to comply with the provisions in the principal 
lease governing use of the premises. See Wheeler v. Earle, 5 Cush. 
31, 35; Miller v. Prescott, 163 Mass. 12, 13; Swaim, Crocker's Notes 
on Common Forms (7th ed.) §§747,759.7 
The clauses relative to use usually found in leases are the require-
ment to use the premises only for a stated purpose,s and "not to carry 
on any trade or occupation ... or make or suffer any use ... which is 
offensive, improper, noisy or contrary to law or ordinance, injurious to 
any persons or property, or liable to invalidate or increase the premium 
for any insurance on the building or liable to render necessary any 
alterations or additions to the building."9 [Emphasis added.] In Wheeler 
v. Earle10 and Miller v. Prescott,u the major lease contained the re-
striction not to make or suffer the prohibited use, and in each case the 
Supreme Judicial Court held that this empowered the major lessor to 
enter to terminate the major lease for breach by the sublessee even 
though the major lessee (the sublessor) knew nothing about the 
wrongful use.12 If the major lease in the Hook case contained the 
words "or suffer," then the result would naturally follow from the 
cited cases because otherwise the sublessor would be helpless to stop 
acts of his sublessee which would constitute a default under the major 
lease, and it would not be a hardship on the sublessee to imply a 
covenant in the sublease not to violate the restriction in the major 
lease whether or not the sublessee knew of it when he executed the 
sublease.13 However, the Court in the Hook case seems to go beyond 
this. Mere knowledge by the sublessee that his sublessor would have 
"a principal lease of the type usually granted" by the major lessor was 
held sufficient to imply a covenant in the sublease requiring the sub-
lessee "so to conduct itself as to comply with the provisions in the 
principal lease governing use14 of the premises." If this means that 
71965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 27, 33, 203 N.E.2d 681, 686. The full citations of the quota-
tion are Wheeler v. Earle, 5 Cush. 31, 35 (Mass. 1849); Miller v. Prescott, 163 Mass. 
12, 13, 39 N.E. 409 (1895); Swaim, Crocker's Notes on Common Forms §§747, 759 
(7th ed. 1955). 
S See Schwartz §§4.1-4.7. 
9 See Schwartz §§7.35-7.37, 7.40 nn.9-12. 
10 See note 7 supra. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Termination of the major lease would terminate the sublease. Schwartz §9.20 
n.5. The sublessee could not in good conscience assert such termination as a breach 
of the usual covenant against quiet enjoyment. 
13 In Wheeler v. Earle, 5 Cush. 31 (Mass. 1849), the Court stated that the sub-
lessee took only the title of his sublessor, and therefore took subject to the restriction. 
In Miller v. Prescott, 163 Mass. 12, 39 N.E. 409 (1895), the Court said that the only 
way to give effect to the word "suffer" in the major lease was to treat it as a stipula-
tion by the lessee that there shall be no wrongful use by anyone occupying under 
him. 
14 There was only a sketchy agreement in the Hook case. If a lengthy, detailed 
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14 1965 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETIS LAW §2.2 
the covenant will be implied whether or not the provisions relative to 
use require the lessor not to make Of' sufJef' specified uses, and whether 
or not stated negatively, then a sublessee with knowledge of the major 
lease will be bound by a major lease provision that the "lessee" will use 
the premises only for a specified purpose as well as by a restriction in 
the head lease "not to make" any offensive or other use, even though 
the sublessee is not in privity with the major lessor.lli This would 
seem to extend the Massachusetts'rule beyond that previously under-
stood,16 and in effect requires the sublessee to assume the obligations 
of the major lease with respect to use of the premises.l'1 
It is to be noted, however, that the covenant will probably not be 
implied in a detailed sublease in which all desired contingencies seem 
to have been considered by the parties.18 Moreover, the case leaves 
open the question as to whether other covenants will be implied in 
the sublease; e.g., a covenant to pay taxes or to repair contained in the 
major lease and of which the sublessee had knowledge.le 
§2.2. Fraudulent misrepresentations: Surrender. Prior to Ka-
batchnik v. Hanovef'-Elm Bldg. COf'p.,l the rule of caveat emptor was 
liberally applied in Massachusetts to exempt an overreaching vendor 
from liability for false statements as to value and similar matters, on 
the ground that he was merely indulging in sales talk or expressing an 
opinion upon which the vendee had no right to rely. In Kabatchnik 
the Supreme Judicial Court held actionable a false statement by the 
defendant to his prospective lessee that another person would lease at 
the rental demanded by the defendant, and thereby as the Court ad-
mitted aligned itself with the more modem, majority view. In Pepsi-
Cola Metf'Opolitan Bottling Co. v. Pleasuf'e Island, Inc.,2 decided 
during the 1965 SURVEY year, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit, relying on Yef'id v. Mason,S wherein the Court 
stated that it was still the law in Massachusetts that "false statements 
of opinion, of conditions to exist in the future or of matters promissory 
in nature are not actionable," quite properly refused to excuse a lessee 
who complained that he had been induced to sign a lease at $25,000 
sublease had been executed. the Court would probably not imply such a covenant. 
Cf. Essex-Lincoln Garage. Inc. v. City of Boston. lI42 Mass. 719. 175 N.E.2d 466 (1961). 
noted in 1961 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §4.5. 
111 Miller v. Prescott. 165 Mass. 12. 59 N.E. 409 (IS95); Schwartz §9.18 nn.50. 51. 
18Cf. Schwartz §9.19 nn.15-17. 
17 See Annotation. 24 A.L.R.2d 700 (1952). 
18 See note 14 supra. 
18 Cf. Annotation. 24 A.L.R.2d 700 (1952). 
§2.2. 1528 Mass. 541. 105 N.E.2d 692 (1952). noted in Annotation. 50 A.L.R.2d 
918 (1955). 1955 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §5.1; same case. 551 Mass. 556. 119 N.E.2d 
169 (1954). 
21145 F.2d 617 (1st Cir. 1965). 
8541 Mass. 527. 170 N.E.2d 71S (1960). discussed in 1961 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 
§5.4. The Court distinguished Yorke v. Taylor. 552 Mass. 568.124 N.E.2d 912 (1955). 
noted in 1955 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§1.5. 8.1; 1968 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §3.7. 
nn.l. 5. 
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§2.3 LANDLORD AND TENANT 15 
a year upon the false representation that a competitor would do so 
if he failed to sign. The representation actually amounted to no more 
than a truthful statement that the competitor's local officials had ap-
proved such a lease, coupled with the statement by the lessor's repre-
sentative that a vice-president of the competitor had traveled from the 
home office to Boston to sit in on the negotiations and would go back 
and procure official approval. This was no more than a prediction of 
events which the lessor could not control. 
The Pepsi-Cola case also involved the question of surrender, the 
lessee defending against a claim of breach on the ground that the lessor 
continued to operate a theater on the premises, as the lessee had done, 
after the lessee had vacated. The Court found, however, that the 
lessor's motive in operating the theater was to protect its investment 
in the park in which the premises were located. Moreover, the prem-
ises continued to be available to the lessee and the facts indicated no 
intention to exclude the lessee. The Court properly cited Bandera v. 
Donahue4 and Roberts v. Wish5 as authority. 
§2.3. Statutory notice to quit. In United States v. Farese,1 the 
agent of a lessor of two stalls in a garage admitted federal agents to 
one of the stalls and permitted them to examine an automobile which 
had been left by his lessees. TJte present case involved a motion by 
one of the lessees, subsequently convicted of stealing the car, to sup-
press any materials taken from the car prior to his indictment on the 
ground that no search warrant had been obtained. Rent had been 
paid to January 27 and the federal agents made their visit on January 
30. The lessor's agent had not obtained the name or address of the 
defendant. The court ruled that 
the tenancy at will had terminated by virtue of the landlord's 
exercise of his right of reentry and his reassertion of control of 
the stalls; that the landlord was excused from the requirements 
of Mass. G.L. ch. 186, sec. 12,2 since there was no way of know-
ing to whom or where notice should be sent, and that this statute 
did not provide the exclusive mode of determining the tenancy 
in this situation; that on January 30 neither defendant had any 
right to exclusive occupancy or possession ... ; that both stalls 
were left unlocked and unpaid for; ... that ... the owner, acting 
through his representative ... was conducting himself reasonably 
in causing physical examination of the . . . car to be made in 
the hope that it would furnish a clue to the identity of the 
strangers who had made the rental; ... that ... there was little 
likelihood that the defendants would return.s 
4326 Mass. 563, 95 N.E.2d 654 (1950). 
Ii 265 Mass. 179, 163 N.E. 892 (1928). 
§2.3. 1242 F. Supp. 574 (D. Mass. 1965). 
2Id. at 575. 
8 The statute provides for termination of a tenancy at will on 14-days notice for 
nonpayment of rent. G.L., c. 186, §U, contains a similar provision relative to leases. 
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It is submitted that the court's conclusion that there had been no 
unlawful search or seizure was probably correct because the auto-
mobile appeared to have been abandoned. It is doubtful, however, 
whether it is correct to state that the fourteen-day notice is dispensed 
with merely because the lessor does not know where or to whom to 
send the notice,4 or to conclude that a tenancy at will can be deter-
mined by entry because the statute does not provide an exclusive mode 
of determining the tenancy.5 It would seem clear that if a tenant at 
will went off on an extended trip, leaving no address and locking the 
doors and leaving his furnishings behind and no one on the premises, 
that delivery of a notice to the premises would be insufficient,6 and 
entry even for nonpayment of rent would be ineffective to terminate 
the tenancy. However, if the lessee abandoned the premises, entry by 
the lessor would constitute acceptance of a surrender by operation of 
law. 
§2.4. Lease to Commonwealth: Condition precedent. A lessee of 
a public buildingl or lessor of space to the state or a municipality2 
must not only make certain of compliance with applicable laws, ordi-
nances or by-laws as to the authority of the official executing the 
lease, but must also abide by express limitations on the length of the 
term or other provisions of the lease.s IQ. United States Trust Company 
v. Commonwealth,4 the Supreme Judicial Court was called upon to 
determine which of two statutes, General Laws, Chapter 8, Section 
IOA,5 or General Laws, Chapter 29, Section 26,6 governed the liability 
of the Commonwealth to restore the premises on termination of a 
lease of several floors in the building owned by the plaintiff bank. The 
lease provided in part: "THE LESSEE AGREES that it will, subject 
A tenancy at will may also be terminated by a notice equal to the interval between 
rent payments under C.L., c. 186, §12, usually one month. 
4 Cf. Hodgkins v. Price, 137 Mass. 13 (1884) (tenant away; notice dropped into 
house through open window held insufficient service). 
5 The only recognized method for terminating a tenancy at will is by giving a 
14-day or "30"-day notice, note 3 supra, or by conveyance or other methods recog-
nized in law, Hall, Massachusetts Law of Landlord and Tenant §§179-191 (4th ed. 
1949), which have the effect of destroying the relationship. 
6 See note 4 supra. 
§2.4. 1 Schwartz §§2.13 nn.2-5; 2.14; 6.15 nn.22, 23. 
2 C.L., c. 8, §lOA (state); Commercial Wharf Co. v. City of Boston, 208 Mass. 482, 
94 N.E. 805 (1911) (municipality). 
8 C.L., c. 40, §3; id., c. 29, §26 (maximum term 5 years). As to other limitations 
see, for example, Schwartz §6.15 nn.22, 23 (real estate taxes on leased public lands 
must be paid by lessee). 
4 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 107, 204 N.E.2d 300. 
5 "The Commonwealth, acting through the executive ... head of a state depart-
ment ... and with the approval of the superintendent and of the governor and 
council and of the commission on administration and finance, may lease for the use 
of such department ... , fora term not exceeding five years, premises ... if pro-
vision for rent ... has been made by appropriation." 
6 "No obligation incurred by any officer _ .. of the commonwealth for any pur-
pose in excess of the appropriation . . • for such purposes . . . shall impose any 
liability on the commonwealth." 
5
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to available appropriation, at its expense, prior to the termination of 
this lease, restore the ... premises. . . ." [Emphasis supplied.] The 
Court ruled that General Laws, Chapter 29, Section 26, was of general 
application but that General Laws, Chapter 8, Section lOA, and only 
the latter statute, governed leases and that authority to "lease" in-
cludes not only the power to pay rent but also to incur other obliga-
tions, including the power to restore. Any other interpretation would 
be absurd. If the legislature intended to qualify the power to lease by 
limiting the authority of the state official to restore, it could have 
expressly so provided in the General Laws, Chapter 8, Section IOA,7 
and lessors dealing with the Commonwealth would then be able to 
take appropriate measures in negotiating with the state. 
The Court then peremptorily dismissed the contention that "subject 
to appropriation" in the lease imposed a condition precedent to the 
obligation to restore by stating simply that "the words do not create 
a condition precedent to obligation." The Court apparently con-
strued the words as meaning no more than that restoration would be 
made when (but not if) funds became available. 
§2.5. Lessee's obligation with respect to outside premises. The 
lessee's obligation, in the absence of agreement, is to commit no waste 
to the leased premises.1 The duty does not extend to other areas2 in 
the absence of agreement.3 In this posture of the law, First Safe Deposit 
Bank v. Western Union Tel. CO.4 represents a surprising (and expectedly 
unsuccessful) attempt on the part of a lessor and other tenants to fasten 
liability on a tenant for a fire which resulted from a short circuit in 
a cable in a part of the building outside of the demised premises, 
merely because the cable serviced the defendant exclusively. The cable 
had not been installed by the defendant, was not owned by it, and 
there was no evidence that defendant knew that its electricity came 
through this particular cable, nor was there any practice of inspecting 
cables. There was additional evidence that the fuse which controlled 
the electricity to this cable was oversize but the fuse box (which was 
in a common hallway) would only take oversize fuses and there was 
no evidence that the defendant had installed the fuse box.5 Under 
these facts, the plaintiffs' contention that the defendant knew or should 
have known of deterioration in the cable and was responsible therefor 
could not be sustained.6 
7 Cf. C.L., c. 59, §U, which requires the lessee to pay for real estate taxes on 
leased public land. 
§2.5. 1 Schwartz §7.11. 
2 Summering v. Berger Realty, Inc., 344 Mass. 38, 181 N.E.2d 348 (1962), discussed 
in 1962 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §1.10; Schwartz §7.13 n.3. 
8 Cf. Schwartz §§7.31 nn.20-23; 7.32 n.20; 8.12-8.16. 
4337 F.2d 743 (1st Cir. 1964). 
r; See Carney v. Bereault, 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 257, 204 N.E.2d 448, discussed in §2.6 
infra. 
6 Cf. Cawley v. Northern Waste Co., 239 Mass. 540, 132 N.E. 365 (1921) (landlord 
sued for breach of express covenant not to commit waste; held, breached where 
tenant failed to shut off electricity before pulling fuse, causing a fire). 
6
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§2.6. Lessor's obligation with respect to demised premises. Lia-
bility for defects ordinarily depends upon control. Accordingly, when 
premises are leased to a lessee, the lessor will be excused from liability 
for injury or damage thereafter occurring in or as a result of a defect 
in the demised premises unless the plaintiff can bring the case within 
a narrow category of exceptions. In the 1965 SURVEY year, three cases, 
Carney v. Bereault,l Baldassare v. Crown Furniture CO.,2 and Booth-
man v. Lux,S involved attempts to bring the facts within these excep-
tions. 
(a) In Carney v. Bereault," a garage including equipment was leased 
by the defendant Gulf to the defendant Bereault. A business invitee 
of the lessee was injured when an automobile rolled off an allegedly 
defective lift. The lease provided that the lessee was to "keep said 
premises ... equipment ... in good condition and repair" and not 
"paint ... the buildings or ... equipment ... (nor) make alterations, 
additions or changes .... "6 Control was disclaimed by the lessor, viz: 
"N one of the provisions of this lease shall be construed as reserving 
to the Lessor any right to exercise control over the . . . business . . . 
of the lessee .... " There was evidence that the lessor's servicemen had 
repaired the equipment from time to time and had repaired the lift 
about two weeks prior to the accident. The jury found for the plain-
tiff against the lessee but a verdict was directed in favor of the lessor,e 
and the plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Judicial Court ruled in favor 
of Gulf. After pointing out, without citation,7 that "[t]his is not a 
case where the landlord has retained control of a portion of the 
premises,"8 the Court indicated that the plaintiff's rights were deriva-
tive from the lessee and therefore could claim no greater right than 
the latter,e and proceeded to determine what rights the lessee would 
have had against the lessor. The Court stated that the clause prohibit-
ing alterations by the lessee10 did not shift the burden of making re-
pairs to the lessor; that in the absence of a contractual obligation to 
repair the lessor would be liable only for gross negligence in making 
§2.6. 11965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 257,204 N.E.2d 448. 
21965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 759,207 N.E.2d 268. 
81965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1055, 208 N.E.2d 819. 
" 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 257, 204 N.E.2d 448, also noted in §5,4 infra. 
6 As to the lessor's rights if lessee fails to comply with this and like restrictions, 
see Schwartz §7.!16 n.lI. 
e The plaintiff sued (1) the manufacturer of the lift for alleged defects in manu-
facture, (2) the lessor of the garage, (lI) the lessee, (4) the serviceman, and (5) the 
owner of the catapulting automobile. 
7 Cf. Nunan v. Dudley Properties, Inc., lI25 Mass. 551, 91 N.E.2d 840 (1950); 
Schwartz §7.2 n.S. See also Mason v. Lieberman, 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 915, 20S N.E.2d 
222, discussed §2.S infra. 
81965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 257, 262, 204 N.E.2d 44S, 452. 
e The Court cited Carney v. Conveyancers Title Ins. Be Mortgage Co., !109 Mass. 
197, 199, lI4 N.E.2d 654, 655 (1941); Lischner v. Hahn, 2711 Mass. 259, 262, 1711 N.E. 
424, 425 (1950); Te11ess v. Gardiner, 266 Mass. 90, 92, 164 N.E. 914, 914-915 (1914). 
Compare Boronskis v. Texas Co., lI44 Mass. 477, ISlI N.E.2d 127 (1962), where the 
injury was to adjacent property. 
10 See text supported by note 5 supra. 
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repairs;l1 and that, even if a contractual obligation to repair had been 
proved, breach thereof would subject the lessor to liability in tort to 
the plaintiff for the defect only if he had agreed to keep the premises 
in safe condition.12 
The Court concluded by dismissing "[t]he only other theory upon 
which the plaintiff might recover ... [viz] that the lift was in a danger-
ous condition at the time of the demise of the premises." Ordinarily, 
there is no implied covenant of fitness when a lessor demises premises. IS 
One exception14 is a latent defect which exists at the commencement 
of the tenancy and which the lessor knows15 exists and fails to disclose 
to his tenant.16 But the plaintiff would have had the burden of proving 
each of these facts and the evidence did not sustain this theory. 
The Court also considered and dismissed the liability of the manu-
facturer of the lift for alleged defects in manufacture.17 Of interest 
in this connection was the Court's statement that it would not over-
rule the trial court's exclusion of a question as to commercial standards 
established by manufacturers, because" '[o]ur cases have long held that 
evidence of a general practice or what is customarily done by others 
may in the judge's discretion be received on the issue of negligence: "18 
[Citing cases.] 
(b) In Baldasarre v. Crown Furniture CO.,19 also involving lease of 
an entire building, the plaintiff, whose intestate was a traveler on the 
highway killed when the building collapsed, tried to fix responsibility 
on the lessor under the "contemplation"20 doctrine of Whalen v. 
Shivek,21 which the Supreme Judicial Court paraphrased as follows: 
[the lessor] could be found to be liable for any condition of the 
11 The Court cited Diamond v. Simcovitz, 310 Mass. 150, 153, 37 N.E.2d 258, 260 
(1941); Bergeron v. Forest,233 Mass. 392, 398, 124 N.E. 74, 84 (1919); Feely v. Doyle, 
222 Mass. 155, 109 N.E. 902 (1915); Thomas v. Lane, 221 Mass. 447, 452, 109 N.E. 363, 
364·365 (1915). 
12 Fiorntino v. Mason, 233 Mass. 451, 453·454, 124 N.E. 283, 283·284 (1919). See 
Miles v. Janvrin, 196 Mass. 431, 433, 82 N.E. 708, 708·709 (1907). If there is merely 
an agreement to repair, as opposed to one to keep in safe condition, then a breach 
of agreement will subject the lessor to liability only in contract, and then only to 
his covenantee, the lessee; and, unlike the Fiorntino type of covenant, notice in the 
latter case to the lessor is a condition precedent to his liability. Schwartz §7.2 
nn.20·23. 
181965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 257, 263, 204 N.E.2d 448, 453. See, generally, Schwartz 
§§3.9, 3.10. 
14 Schwartz §3.10. 
15 Or should have known, Schwartz §3.10 n.7. 
16 The Court cited Stumpf v. Leland, 242 Mass. 168,171,136 N.E. 399, 400 (1922); 
Green v. Hammon.d, 223 Mass. 318, 321, 111 N.E. 875, 876 (1916). See also Schwartz 
§3.l0 nn.l0, 11. 
17 Under the doctrine of Carter v. Yardley Be Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693 
(1946). There is a good discussion of the limitations on the application of the rule 
of that case. 
181965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 257, 264, 204 N.E.2d 448, 453. 
19 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 759, 207 N.E.2d 268. 
20 Schwartz §7.31 n.14, which also discusses the related doctrine of "continuing 
nuisance." 
21326 Mass. 142, 93 N.E.2d 393 (1950). 
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building constituting a nuisance and a source of danger to persons 
using the sidewalk below (a) which existed at the time of the 
letting ... and (b) of which she knew or ought to have known. Her 
responsibility would not end with the lease. See Prosser, Torts 
(3d ed.) §63 at pp. 414-415, §70 at pp. 482-486.22 
This would be so even though the acts or omissions of the lessee and 
independent contractors performing work on the building intervened. 
However, there was no proof that the structural weakness was known 
or should have been known to the lessor when she leased the premises 
to the lessee, the only evidence being that signs of weakness appeared 
after the letting. Nevertheless, the Court found the lessor liable on 
the theory that she "at least shared in the control of the building and 
in the obligation to take precautions."23 The Court based this con-
clusion on evidence that the lessor was related by blood and by marriage 
to the various officers of the corporate lessee; that the city had re-
quested repairs; that she or her agents had conferred with city repre-
sentatives about the building; and that applications for permits to do 
corrective work had been filed on her behalf by the engineer and the 
builder who had been hired by officers (her relatives) of the lessee. The 
building had been condemned unless it was made safe. She knew this, 
as did the lessee. The lessee had hurried the engineer and builder 
to complete the work and they prematurely removed most of the sup-
porting jacks, causing collapse of the building. Under these circum-
stances, she and the lessee (even though not her agent) would both be 
liable as occupiers of real estate to travelers on the highway. The ease 
with which the Court reached the conclusion of control based upon 
the close relationship of the lessor and the lessee's officers, in an effort 
to reach an eminently desirable conclusion, makes one wonder why 
the Court has not also swept aside technical considerations in deter-
mining who has control in the common stairway cases. In those cases 
liability of the lessor is based upon deterioration in the common area 
after commencement of the particular tenancy, and a change in owner-
ship of the property, no matter how technical, will be deemed to create 
a new tenancy and to relieve the transferee of liability.24 
(c) In Carney v. Bereault,25 the Court stated that there is ordinarily 
221965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 759, 76S, 207 N.E.2d 26S, 275. 
231965 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 769, 207 N.E.2d at 275. The Court cited Regan v. Nelson, 
345 Mass. 67S, 6S0-6S1, lS9 N.E.2d 516, 51S-519 (1963), 1963 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 
§1.l2; Whalen v. Shivek, 326 Mass. 142, 153-160, 93 N.E.2d 393, 400-404 (1950); 
Graselli Dyestuff Corp. v. John Campbell & Co., 259 Mass. 103, lOS-l09, 156 N.E. 17, 
lS-19 (1927). . 
24 As in Auld v. Jordan, 340 Mass. 22S, 163 N.E.2d 296 (1960), discussed in 1960 
Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §1.1 (incorporation of lessor created charge of ownership 
which terminated tenancy at will relationship with L, and created a new one with 
L., Inc., for purposes of application of common stairway rule, even though L owned 
and controlled L., Inc., and lessee had no knowledge of the incorporation or transfer 
of the record ti tie). 
25 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 257, 204 N.E.2d 44S, discussed in text supported by notes 
4-1S supra. 
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no warranty of fitness by the lessor with certain exceptions, one of 
which is a latent defect. The plaintiff in Boothman v. LUX26 at-
tempted to capitalize upon another exception, applicable to a lease of 
a furnished apartment.27 The plaintiff had rented for one night (as he 
had done on other occasions) a fully furnished room on the second 
floor of the defendant's house. The second floor had a landing at the 
top of the stairway and a hallway area with a kitchenette and bathroom 
which plaintiff could use. Before retiring, the plaintiff went to the 
landing to see whether the downstairs light was out and slipped on a 
piece of soap wedged into a crack on the landing, falling downstairs. 
The defendant appealed from a verdict for the plaintiff. The Supreme 
Judicial Court stated that, since the case was tried on the theory that 
the plaintiff's lodging for one night resulted in a demise, it would 
deal with it on the same footing; i.e., as a demise of a furnished apart-
ment to which the rule of Ingalls v. Hobbs28 was applicable. 
There it was held that one, who lets for a short term of a few days, 
weeks or months a fully furnished house supposedly equipped for 
immediate occupancy as a dwelling without the necessity of any 
fitting up or furnishing by the tenant, impliedly agrees that the 
house and its appointments are suitable for occupation in their 
condition at the time.29 
However, the Ingalls rule was not applicable because the landing was 
not part of the "demised" premises. "Because of this disposition of 
the case, we need not decide whether the piece of soap on the landing 
was such a defect within the Ingalls rule."30 The Court went on to say, 
by implication, that the night's lodging was merely a license to use the 
premises, to which the ordinary negligence rules applicable to a licensee 
of land,31 and not the rule of Ingalls v. Hobbs, would apply. 
§2.7. Lessor's obligation with respect to common areas. (a) Mika-
lOTOS v. Stamatouras,1 decided during the 1965 SURVEY year, is a run-
261965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1055, 208 N.E.2d 819. 
27 See Schwartz §3.l1. Cf. id. §3.l2 (short term occupancy for a public purpose). 
28156 Mass. 348, 31 N.E. 286 (1892). 
29 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1055, 1057, 208 N.E.2d 819, 820. The Court also noted, as 
being to the same effect, Legere v. Asselta, 342 Mass. 178, 172 N.E.2d 685 (1961); 
Ackarey v. Carbonaro, 320 Mass. 537, 70 N.E.2d 418 (1946); Hacker v. Nitschke, 310 
Mass. 754, 756, 39 N.E.2d 644, 646 (1942). 
The basis of liability is contractual and the contract is made with the lessee and 
does not extend to his family or invitees. Schwartz §3.11 n.2. The defect must exist 
at the commencement of the tenancy. Davenport v. Squibb, 320 Mass. 629, 70 N.E.2d 
793 (1947); Chelefou v. Springfield Institution for Savings, 297 Mass. 236, 8 N.E.2d 
769 (1937). 
801965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1055, 1057, 208 N.E.2d 819, 821. If this cryptic remark is 
intended to mean the rule does not apply to such a defect, there would seem to be 
no justification for it. The Ingalls case (note 28 supra) involved bugs which hardly 
constitute a "defect" in the usual sense. . 
81 The Court cited Bearse v. Fowler, 347 Mass. 179, 196 N.E.2d 910 (1964); Kitchen 
v. Women's City Club of Boston, 267 Mass. 229, 166 N.E. 554 (1929). See Schwartz 
§3.4. 
§2.7. 11965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 481, 206 N.E.2d 62, also noted in §5.1 infra. 
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of-mill common stairway liability case which reaffirms that it was a 
question of fact whether (1) the downstairs rear hallway in a two-
family house, where plaintiff had fallen, was a common passageway 
over which the landlord had retained control; (2) the landlord had 
impliedly undertaken as part of the letting to keep the hallway 
lighted and had failed to do SO;2 (3) the plaintiff (who had been visiting 
the landlord's mother-in-law in the landlord's upstairs apartment) had 
ceased to be a social guest of the landlords at the time of the accident 
and had become the guest of the tenant, whose wife she was visiting on 
the date of the accident; and (4) there was a causal connection between 
failure to light the hallway and the injury. 
(b) Underhill v. Shactman4 gave some relief from the harshness of 
the "common stairway" rule5 by distinguishing the case of a customer 
of a shopping center, injured by a defect in a common area, on the 
ground that the plaintiff was there by an implied invitation from the 
owner of the shopping center, and therefore would be afforded the 
same protection as any business invitee of an occupier of real estate.6 
In Cronin v. Universal Carloading and Distributing CO.,T decided dur-
ing the 1965 SURVEY year, the Supreme Judicial Court likewise found 
an implied invitation by the railroad, owner and lessor of various 
portions of a freight house with a loading platform, to truckers to use 
the yard in making deliveries to the various tenants. However, the 
Court found no liability in these circumstances. The plaintiff, a truck 
driver who was making a delivery to the codefendant, a tenant of a 
defined area in the freight house, used a short cut, as other truck 
drivers were in the habit of doing, by climbing up some makeshift rungs 
nailed to the front of the platform (at a point outside of the premises 
leased to the codefendant), and was injured when one of the rungs 
broke. The Court said that proper stairs for access were available; that 
there was no evidence that the railroad had put the rungs up or that 
they were support timbers; and that the railroad's invitation did not 
extend to the use of the "ladder." The Court concluded by stating: 8 
2 There is no common law duty on the part of the landlord to light the common 
areas, or remove snow or ice or rubbish. Campbell v. Romanos, 346 Mass. 361, 191 
N.E.2d 764 (1963). See Schwartz §7.3 n.5; Hall, Massachusetts Law of Landlord and 
Tenant §199 nn.5·9 (5th ed. 1949). Such a duty may be required by statute, which 
usually imposes criminal but not civil liability, id. §199 n.5, or as part of the contract 
of letting. Campbell v. Romanos, supra. 
S If the accident had occurred when the plaintiff was still a guest of the landlord, 
the duty of the landlord would have been only that of an occupier of real estate to 
a licensee, and the landlord would not have been liable in the absence of a showing 
of gross negligence. Prosser, Torts 387, 388 (3d ed. 1964). 
4337 Mass. 730, 151 N.E.2d 287 (1958), noted in 1958 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§l.l, 
3.5. 
ti The landlord has the duty to use reasonable care to keep the common areas in 
as good condition as they were in or appeared to be in at the time of the letting. 
Schwartz §7.3 n.5. See §2.6, note 24 supra. See also 1963 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §1.l2. 
6 Prosser, Torts 394, 395 (3d ed. 1964). 
11965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 411,204 N.E.2d 917, also noted in §5.1 infra. 
81965 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 416-417, 204 N.E.2d at 921. 
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The railroad did not owe Cronin, with respect to any part of the 
yard as to which the invitation did not reasonably extend, the duty 
of care which it would owe to an invitee .... Nor did the invita-
tion extend to any type of use other than that reasonable in the 
circumstances .... [Therefore it was] unnecessary ... to determine 
whether ... it could be found (a) that there was an indication 
prior to the accident of any defect ... or (b) that any defect had 
existed for a long enough time so that the railroad should have 
known of it and removed the timber .... 
It should be noted, in passing, that the Court dismissed a claim 
against the tenant on the ground that the defect was in an area not 
controlled by it.9 
§2.8. Lessor's obligation with respect to other areas under lessor's 
control. Mason v. Lieberman,l also decided during the 1965 SURVEY 
year, simplifies proof as to control, and at the same time creates con-
fusion as to the legal consequences of that control. Although the roof 
services all tenants of a multioccupancy building because it is necessary 
for their shelter and protection,2 it does not follow that exclusive con-
trol of the same may not be given by the landlord to another3 or 
reserved to himsel£.4 Accordingly, it is not always easy for an injured 
plaintiff to establish the "situs" of control. In Mason v. Lieberman,5 
the Supreme Judicial Court ruled that control of the roof may be 
presumed from mere ownership, and that the presumption is re-
buttable only by affirmative proof that control is in another person. 
Having determined that control of the roof of the building in question 
was in the landlord, the Court then assumed without discussion that 
the "common passageway" rule6 was not applicable and held the land-
lord liable to the tenant of the second top floor of an extension of the 
building for damage to his goods caused by collapse of the roof. There 
were other tenants in the building but apparently none had access to 
the roof. Negligence was established by reason of the landlord's failure 
to take appropriate protective measures after having been given ade-
quate notice of leaks. The Court quoted: 
"Where no 'common passageway' is involved, the rule is that a 
person in control of a building, or of a part thereof, is required to 
exercise reasonable care to keep it in such condition that others 
will not be injured in their persons or property." Regan v. Nelson, 
345 Mass. 678, 680. "This duty of due care extends as much to an 
occupant of another part of the same building, whether the negli-
9 See §2.5 supra. 
§2.8. 11965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 915, 208 N.E.2d 222. 
2 Schwartz §7.S n.4. 
8As in Yom v. Lynch, 226 Mass. 15S, 115 N.E. 2S8 (1917), where the roof was 
leased exclusively to a sign company. 
4 Schwartz §7.4 n.l; cf. id. §S.20, Exceptions and reservations. 
51965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 915, 208 N.E.2d 222. 
6 See §2.7, note 5 supra. 
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gent person be landlord or tenant, as it does to an adjoining 
proprietor or to a traveller on the highway." Gilroy v. Badger, 
301 Mass. 494, 496.7 
This is the rule applicable to an occupier of real estate. It is sub-
mitted this case either overrules prior decisions in this area, or must 
be limited to its facts. 
In Cox v. Rothenberg8 and Williams v. Pomeroy9 the roof collapsed, 
damaging the plaintiff tenant's goods. The Court held that the com-
mon passageway rule applied but denied liability because the accident 
was vis major. In Sullivan v. Northridge,lO the Court found that the 
roof of a piazza, which serviced the plaintiff's apartment exclusively, 
was part of the main roof in the exclusive control of the landlord, and 
applied the common passageway rule in finding for the plaintiff for 
injuries suffered when the roof fell. In Devine v. Lyman,u a drainpipe 
which drained water from the roof (found to be in the landlord's 
control) and which passed through the plaintiff's premises, lost a plug 
inside the demised premises, resulting in flood damage to the tenant's 
goods. The Court applied the common passageway rule. Other ex-
amples may be cited.12 
On the other hand, the Court has shown a tendency to apply the 
"occupier of land" rule to certain areas in the lessor's control, such as 
vacant apartments,lS a tunnel adjacent to an exterior wall,a a lot 
contiguous to the building and over which deliveries were made,ll> 
and other areas.16 The Court seemed even to apply the "occupier" 
rule to a common hallway where fire had started in an accumulation 
of rubbish.17 
The Court in Mason v. Lieberman cited Yorra v. Lynch.18 This case 
may provide a clue to the Court's ratio decidendi. In that early case, 
the landlord leased the "roof" to a sign company. The building was 
separated from the next building by a party wall which was higher 
than the roof of the other building. The Court said that it could be 
71965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 915, 917, 208 N.E.2d 222, 223. The full citations of the 
cases quoted in the opinion are Regan v. Nelson, 345 Mass. 678, 680, 189 N.E.2d 516, 
518 (1963); Gilroy v. Badger, 301 Mass. 494, 496, 17 N.E.2d 702, 703 (1938). 
8331 Mass. 391, 119 N.E.2d 193 (1954). 
9254 Mass. 290, 150 N.E. 90 (1926). 
10246 Mass. 382, 141 N.E. 114 (1923), same case, 250 Mass. 270, 145 N.E. 460 (1924). 
11 270 Mass. 246, 169 N.E. 908 (1930). 
12 Stewart v. Morgan, 316 Mass. 164, 55 N.E.2d 2 (1944) (chimney). 
IS Gilroy v. Badger, 301 Mass. 494, 17 N.E.2d 702 (1938); Moss v. Grove Hall Sav-
ings Bank, 290 Mass. 520, 195 N.E. 762 (1935). 
14 Globe Leather &: Shoe Findings, Inc. v. Goldburgh, 339 Ma:ss. 380, 159 N.E.2d 
338 (1959). 
15 Regan v. Nelson, 345 Mass. 678, 189 N.E.2d 516 (1963). 
16 Yorra v. Lynch, 226 Mass. 153, 115 N.E. 238 (1917). 
17 Chalfen v. Kraft, 324 Mass. 1, 84 N.E.2d 454 (1949). But d. Campbell v. 
Romanos, 346 Mass. 361, 191 N.E.2d 764 (1963), discussed in 1963 Ann. Surv. Mass. 
Law §1.12, which seems identical on the facts but where the Court denied liability 
under the common passageway rule. 
18 Note 16 supra. 
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presumed that the party wall was built by the defendant owner, or 
his predecessor, and was in his control; that a lease of the roof to the 
sign company did not include the party wall; that the "common 
passageway" rule did not apply where an iron capping of the party wall 
fell, striking the plaintiff tenant who was looking out of her window 
at the time. The party wall in Y orra clearly did not service the various 
tenants, particularly because of the intervening lease of the roof to 
the sign company. Perhaps the Court in Mason believed that the roof 
over the extension was in a like category. If this is so, the Mason case 
can be limited to its facts. On the other hand, the Mason case may 
represent a revulsion of feeling from the harshness of the "common 
passageway" rule. The Court may be saying that recovery will be 
granted if injury results to the tenant or one claiming under him 
while using the demised premises, even if the injury results from a 
defect in a common passageway or like area.19 This would then leave 
subject to the common passageway rule cases where the plaintiff is 
injured while using the common area.20 
The only thing clear, however, is that the law is now in confusion. 
How much simpler it would be if our court, or the legislature, would 
abolish the obsolete common passageway rule and bring our law into 
harmony with that of other jurisdictions which apply the "occupier" 
rule even to common passageways.21 
B. LEGISLATION 
§2.9. Notice of lease. General Laws, Chapter 185, Section 71, has 
been amended by Chapter 37 of the Acts of 1965 to eliminate doubts 
heretofore expressed1 as to the effectiveness of filing of notices of leases 
relating to registered land. Commencing May 16, 1965, "leases or 
notices of leases," as defined in the General Laws, Chapter 183, Section 
4, "of registered land for a term of seven years or more shall be regis-
tered in lieu of recording." [Emphasis supplied.] Left untouched, 
however, is the continuing discrepancy between the types of "seven 
year" leases subject to recordation or registration. General Laws, 
Chapter 183, Section 4, requires recording of leases "for more than 
seven years from the making thereof." [Emphasis supplied.] Tech-
nically, this could include a lease for one year, if it began more than 
seven years in the future.2 
§2.10. Automatic locking of doors. Chapter 464 of the Acts of 
1965, effective January 1, 1966, adds another restrictive section (Sec-
tion 3R) to the General Laws, Chapter 143. Main doors of apartment 
19 As in Yorra v. Lynch, note 16 supra. 
20 Martin v. Christman, 320 Mass. 696, 71 N.E.2d 111 (1947) (plaintiff hanging 
clothes injured when she fell through rotted roof platform where clothes were hung 
by tenants). 
21 See 1963 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §1.l2. 
§2.9. 1 Scl!wartz §5.11 nn.6·9. 
2 Scl!wartz §5.ll n.2. 
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houses having more than three apartments other than lodging houses 
and dormitories will be required to lock automatically under penalty 
of a fine. 
§2.11. Summary process: Eviction. The authority of the court to 
stay execution for a total of nine months in summary process matters 
is extended to June 30, 1967.1 
§2.1l. 1 Acts of 1965. c. 520. amending Acts of 1946. c. 43. 
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